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Reference, together with truth and meaning, is one of the central —and perennial— prob-
lems in the philosophy of language, with a long tradition of research (especially within the 
analytic paradigm), in which two approaches have been immensely influential: the ear-
lier one, proposed by Gottlob Frege (and further developed by Bertrand Russell and Peter 
Strawson, on the one hand, and Rudolf Carnap and Richard Montague, on the other), and 
the more recent, counter Fregean stance, originating with Saul Kripke’s work, and advo-
cated by, among others, Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, and Hilary Putnam. According to 
the Fregean account (and much contemporary formal semantics) what “a linguistic expres-
sion refers to depends (…) on the mental state of the speaker who uses it” (p. 2). In con-
trast, the Kripkean approach highlights “the crucial role played by worldly historical facts 
that may be unknown to the speaker” (p. 2).
The book edited by Andrea Bianchi is a collection of 18 texts discussing crucial aspects 
of reference, and divided into three parts: on the nature of reference, on the relations be-
tween reference and cognition, and on the place of reference within semantic theory. The 
collection deserves an in-depth review; below, however, the chapters are only briefly men-
tioned and commented upon (since it would be virtually impossible to choose and single 
out ‘the most interesting ones’).
In the introduction, ‘Open Problems on Reference’, Andrea Bianchi provides a con-
cise and very useful overview of problems related to contemporary research on reference. 
He divides them into three groups: the foundational problems (connected especially with 
identifying the very notion of reference, and attempting to work out a general theory of ref-
erence), problems stemming from our understanding of cognition, and the semantic prob-
lems proper (such as e.g. proper names in a theory of reference, indefinite descriptions, 
etc.). He also observes that talking about things, the triggering mechanism for reference, is 
a result of the interaction of a number of different cognitive abilities, the properties of lan-
guage, and the contribution of the context, which means that studying reference needs to 
take into consideration cognitive aspects as well.
Six papers in the first part, ‘The Nature of Reference’, address the foundational issues. 
Christopher Gauker claims in ‘The Illusion of Semantic Reference’, that we “are misled by 
our ordinary practices of attributing knowledge of meanings” (p. 22), and hence argues, 
somewhat controversially, for a semantics that does not appeal to reference, and concludes 
that “The hard work of dispensing with semantic reference lies in constructing alternative 
accounts of those linguistic and mental phenomena that we might have thought we should 
explain in terms of semantic reference” (p. 38). Diego Marconi focuses on ‘Reference and 
Theories of Meaning as Use’. He discusses Wittgenstein’s contribution to the debate, Paul 
Horwich’s approach, and contrasts the accounts of semantic value based on the notion of 
use and semantic externalism. Edouard Machery, Justin Sytsma, and Max Deutsch present 
in their contribution, ‘Speaker’s Reference and Cross-Cultural Semantics’, the results of 
some empirical studies which considerably modify Kripke’s anti-descriptivist intuitions, 
and arrive at the conclusion that there is strong evidence “that genuine intuitions about se-
mantic reference vary both across and within culture” (p. 74).
The next three chapters investigate the nature of reference in connection with proper 
names. Genoveva Martí concentrates on ‘Reference without Cognition’, and argues against 
some new trends in foundational semantics. She stresses that “Socially or individually, for 
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a sound to be the name of something, there has to be a pattern of repeated, systematic use. 
There has to be a connection between use and use, a chain of uses. The links in the chain 
are not people, they are not users of the name; they are uses of the name” (p. 90). Andrea 
Bianchi discusses in ‘Repetition and Reference’ Kripke’s approach to reference. He ob-
serves that even 40 years after Kripke’s Naming and Necessity there is still no full-blown 
theory based on these principles, and offers his own version of theory (inspired by K aplan’s 
work), concentrating on the (appropriately formalized) notion of ‘repetition’. The last 
chapter in this section is Michael Devitt’s ‘Should Proper Names Still Seem So Problem-
atic?’. Devitt updates his causal theory of names, aiming for a naturalistic (and anti-Car-
tesian) development of Kripke’s theory. Whereas Bianchi is concerned with the theory 
of a proper name’s reference, Devitt focuses on the meaning of proper names (and, in an-
swering the title question, concludes that proper names should not seem so problematic). 
He also emphasizes that any theory of reference “must look to future psycholinguistics for 
more details” (p. 128).
The second part, ‘Reference and Cognitions’, comprises three papers dealing with 
problems related to cognition and various cognitive mechanisms. Antonio Capuano 
contrasts, in ‘Thinking about an Individual’, two pictures of thinking about an object, 
namely, the inside-out and the outside-out pictures. The author shows how these ap-
proaches relate to contemporary philosophy of mind, and again the discussion shows the 
movement from an approach inspired by Frege and Russell (and adopted by Tyler Burge), 
to the one advocated by Kripke and Donnellan. Whereas in the inside-out picture of cog-
nition human cognition is grounded in a non-natural relation, in the outside-in picture 
human cognition is produced by natural-historical processes. Capuano favors the second 
approach and observes that “thinking is like seeing (…), when thinking an object enters 
our mind and strikes us by sending information” (p. 163). The relation between thought 
and different aspects of cognition is further discussed by Marga Reimer in ‘Drawing, See-
ing, Referring: Reflections on Macbeth’s Dagger’. Reimer distinguishes ontic and non-on-
tic reference, concentrates on empty reference, and concludes with the assumption that 
there are in fact objects of hallucination (cf. Macbeth’s dagger), “actual if unreal” (p. 187). 
Such objects, albeit abstract rather than physical are “created by the inadvertent hypostati-
zation of an ordinary visual experience” (p. 184). Reimer’s approach might provide useful 
tools for investigating the ontic status of cognitive states (purportedly) experienced by fic-
tional characters.
In the final chapter of this part, John Perry analyzes ‘The Cognitive Contribution 
of Names’. He considers an issue raised by Frege (in ‘On Sense and Reference’), and con-
nected with identity and cognitively relevant difference. Perry introduces the term ‘direct 
cognitive contribution’ for the property of names that is responsible for the difference in 
the direct cognitive motivation (of the speaker) and cognitive impact (on the hearer) of 
sentences that differ only in containing different names for the same thing (p. 190). This 
approach offers a powerful tool for analyzing the social, historical and political functions 
of proper names. Perry supports a minimalist account of the semantics of proper names 
and defends the referentialist approach, where referentialism with respect to proper names 
is “the view that proper names contribute the thing named to the proposition expressed 
by statements in which they are used” (p. 207). An important part of his argumentation is 
connected with the notion of ‘nambiguity’, i.e. the fact that the same name can be assigned 
to more than one individual (in contrast to individual constants).
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The third part, ‘Reference and Semantics’, contains nine chapters investigating the re-
lation fundamental for philosophy of language (and for linguistics and philosophy in gen-
eral), once again showing the interconnections existing between reference and proper 
names. Ernesto Napoli’s contribution is titled ‘Names as Predicates?’ and as the question 
mark suggests, he disputes the claim that names are predicates, and more precisely, he dis-
putes two theses: that the apparently predicative occurrences of a name are really predica-
tive, and that the apparently argumental occurrences of a name are really non-argumental, 
and hence predicative (under the general assumption that the occurrences of names are ei-
ther argumental or predicative) (p. 211). He demonstrates that being a name of an individ-
ual is not a property of an expression but of occurrences of expressions, and hence “a the-
ory that minimizes the non-literal use of a name by holding that ‘N’ is equivalent to ‘bearer 
of N’ is definitely not the best choice” (p. 223). Robin Jeshion continues with ‘Names Not 
Predicates’. She critically discusses referentialism and predicativism about proper names, 
and takes some steps towards discerning the right semantics for all uses of proper names. 
She challenges the uniformity argument, supposed to favor predicativism over referential-
ism, and concludes that her aims ‘have been almost exclusively critical, largely confined 
to undermining the uniformity argument advanced by predicativists’ (p. 249). In ‘Literal 
Uses of Proper Names’ Delia G. Fara, a well-known proponent of predicativism, disputes 
Jeshion’s criticism, showing that the examples offered in the preceding chapter do not re-
fute predicativism. She briefly summarizes the earlier, classical, approaches (especially ad-
vocated by Tyler Burger, and also to some degree by W.V.O. Quine), where referential 
proper names are considered as the count-noun complements of un unpronounced deter-
miner, such as ‘that’, ‘the’, or ‘some’ (p. 253), and concludes with some methodological re-
marks on constructing an appropriate semantic theory. These two chapters (together with 
J eshion’s rejoinder in the following chapter and Fara’s postscript) offer fascinating insights 
into ‘semantics in the making’, and the illustrate the ongoing search for an adequate seman-
tic account of proper names.
Marco Santambrogio discusses ‘Empty Names, Propositions, and Attitude Ascrip-
tions’. He observes that “empty names pose thorny problems to all semantic theories” 
(p. 295), and in his chapter presents a new-style approach to propositions, which are lan-
guage-bound (and not language-independent). These new-style propositions are ‘the pri-
mary truth bearers only in the sense that they are given their values before the sentences 
expressing them. But they have their values only relative to the sentences of some other 
language, taken as already understood’ (p. 303). Ángel Pinillos returns in ‘Millianism, Re-
lationism, and Attitude Ascriptions’ to Frege’s puzzle, and claims that a solution to it 
might be found in intra-discourse relations (contra Kit Fine’s attempt to introduce inter-
discourse semantic relations into the semantics of mental state ascriptions). Samuel Cum-
ming sketches in ‘The Dilemma of Indefinites’ a novel view of the relation between seman-
tic content and truth; his approach follows from the following observation: an utterance of 
a declarative sentence has a semantic content and it has a truth-value; however the former 
is not sufficient to determine the latter because it is possible to secure reference through 
private commitment, whereas truth conditions are a sort of public commitment. It is only 
‘with expressions that refer by means of public commitment (…) that semantic content and 
truth condition will coincide’ (p. 347-348).
Joseph Almog, Paul Nichols, and Jessica Pepp discuss in ‘A Unified Treatment of 
(Pro-)Nominals in Ordinary English’ the results of their project for a unified theory 
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of nominals (nouns, noun phrases, and pronouns) as ‘they appear in ordinary English’ 
(p. 350). Their proposal and conception of semantics understood as ‘a science of historical 
fact’ allow for unification in the whole domain of cognitive processing of information, and 
integrate linguistic reference with perception. Finally, the last contribution is Edward L. 
Keenan’s ‘Individuals Explained Away’. Keenan constructs a linguistically revealing formal 
semantics of a small fragment of natural language (English agentive nouns with their modi-
fiers). He provides an explicit analysis of relevant entailment patterns, and his minimal se-
mantics dispenses with entities such as possible worlds or proposition, in favor of a Boolean 
construal of classical model theory.
On Reference (together with The Reference Book by John Hawthorne and David 
Manley, OUP 2012, and Empty Representations. Reference & Non-Existence, edited by 
Manuel García-Carpintero and Genoveva Martí, OUP 2014) provides a most interesting 
collection of texts, showing the richness of the debate on the semantic and cognitive prop-
erties of reference; the book will most certainly exert considerable influence upon research 
in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and modern cognitive studies.
Piotr Stalmaszczyk
Department of English and General Linguistics, University of Lodz, Poland 
(piotrst@uni.lodz.pl)
BIBLID 0495-4548(2016)31:2p.267-270
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.16252
Gustavo Caponi. 2014. Leyes sin causa y causas sin ley en la explicación biológica. Colom-
bia: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Gustavo Caponi es uno de los autores más versátiles del área hispanohablante en filosofía 
de la biología. Sus últimos trabajos como La segunda agenda darwiniana (2011) o Réquiem 
por el centauro (2012) se han centrado en problemas epistemológicos. La obra aquí reseñada 
sigue este camino y se centra directamente en dos de los problemas de más actualidad del 
área: la existencia de leyes y la noción de causalidad. En este tour de force, Caponi estructura 
su libro en cuatro capítulos: la existencia de leyes no causales; una interpretación de la cau-
salidad no ligada a nociones nómicas; la aplicación de dicha explicación causal en biología; 
y, finalmente, las consecuencias de esta explicación biológica en un mundo físicamente re-
gido. A modo de adenda, Caponi expone su visión del concepto de función.
La unión entre explicaciones causales y su desarrollo mediante leyes de la naturaleza 
viene estipulada desde el modelo Nomológico-Deductivo desarrollado a mediados del si-
glo xx por autores como Karl Popper o Carl Hempel. Esta unión implicaba que dichas ex-
plicaciones causales cumplieran los requisitos clásicos de una ley de la naturaleza: contenido 
empírico, aplicación universal, o la capacidad de resolver condicionales contrafácticos. Sin 
embargo, esta exigencia nómica para la explicación causal choca con la idea bastante exten-
dida de que no existen leyes en biología. Tal postura se resume en la tesis de la contingencia 
evolutiva de John Beatty, donde la evolución ha sido un fenómeno contingente y, por lo 
tanto, sus posibles regularidades son un producto de ésta.
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